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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.*
W. Scott Henwood*"
and Jacque Smith Clarke**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This year represents the first full survey period' in which the "new"
Georgia Evidence Code, title 24 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.), takes effect. These new rules took effect on January 1, 2013.
The rules conform in large part to the Federal Rules of Evidence and
have continued to change the face of evidence law in Georgia. Appellate
cases are now providing guidance and direction on the courts' interpretation of the rules, and these cases affect litigants' strategies. This Survey
highlights cases decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals and the
Georgia Supreme Court between June 1, 2013 and May 31, 2014 that
have made an impact on evidence law in Georgia.

* Founding Partner in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1981); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1984).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1982-1984); Student Writing Editor (1983-1984). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Of Counsel in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.B.A., 1976); Woodrow Wilson College of Law (J.D., 1978). Former Reporter
of Decisions for the Georgia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Berry College
(B.S., 2010); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2013). Member,
Mercer Law Review (2011-2013). Editorial Board Member, Journal of Southern Legal
History (2014). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of evidence during the prior survey period, see John E. Hall, Jr., W.
Scott Henwood & Alex Battey, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L.
REV. 125 (2013).
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CASE LAW UPDATE

A review of last year's survey and the cases cited therein shows no
2
subsequent notable history modifying those matters. No cases cited in
last year's survey were granted certiorari or were reversed at the time
of this Article's publication. Changes evidenced by new case law are
outlined below and organized by topic.

III.

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

In this survey period, the Georgia Court of Appeals grappled with the
application of the parol evidence rule in the criminal law context. In
Davis v. State,3 a unique case out of Dodge County, Georgia, the court
of appeals held that the parol evidence rule does not apply to contract
discussions for the funding of a business relocation when that relocation
4
proved to involve criminal behavior. In Davis, the defendant, Bruce
Davis, owned multiple clothing manufacturing companies in various
parts of the country. Davis convinced a man named Pruett to loan him
$350,000 to finance the relocation of a Florida trouser plant to a facility
that Pruett owned in Eastman, Georgia. Before signing the contract, the
two met and discussed various terms, including repayment and how the
5
loan proceeds would be spent. Once Davis received the money, he used
the proceeds for "various other business interests, including some related
In fact, Davis never
to [a different] manufacturing facility ....
relocated the Florida plant to Eastman, never made any rent payments
[to Pruett] pursuant to the lease agreement . . ., and never repaid the
loan... .6
At a criminal bench trial for theft by taking, the man who introduced
Davis and Pruett testified concerning Davis's promises to use the loan
proceeds solely for relocating the trouser plant to Eastman. These were
terms outside of the contract itself. The lower court found Davis guilty
of theft by taking after considering this evidence. Davis appealed, and
enumerated as reversible error the trial court's admission of this parol

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See generally Hall, Henwood & Battey, supra note 1.
326 Ga. App. 279, 754 S.E.2d 815 (2014).
Id. at 279, 754 S.E.2d at 815.
Id. at 279-80, 754 S.E.2d at 817-18.
Id. at 280, 754 S.E.2d at 818.
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evidence.7 Specifically, he contended "that the trial court erred in
allowing Pruett and [the man who introduced Davis and Pruett] to
testify regarding promises that Davis made prior to the execution of, yet
not incorporated into, the contracts regarding how the funds would be
spent."8
The court of appeals disagreed with Davis, holding that the parol
evidence rule was inapplicable to the contracts at issue.9 The court
stated that "the purpose of the parol evidence rule is 'to bring finality to
an agreement, except when ambiguity requires that the language of the
contract be explained but not varied.'"'1 The court declined to extend
this contractual rule to the evidence admitted in this particular criminal
case, stating, "[Ciriminal law is less concerned with the finality of
agreements between two private parties."" The court considered the
statements admissible and relevant in this criminal context, particularly
because the statements showed Davis's intent, a necessary element of
theft by taking, which the court, in a footnote, compared with "fraud in
the inducement" in the civil context where parol evidence is generally
admissible. 2 The court cited a plethora of other jurisdictions in
agreement in the notes as well, l" but reserved creating a broad rule for
parol evidence in criminal cases, statingThis Court is not aware of any reported decisions, and the parties
direct us to none, where an appellate court excluded parol evidence in
the context of a criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, we are not
prepared to say, and we do not say, that the parol evidence rule will
never apply in any criminal context. We leave that question for
another day. 4
Thus, the court of appeals sailed nimbly through "uncharted jurisprudential waters," as it characterized the issues presented. 5
This
interesting conflict between a traditionally civil rule and its application
in the criminal context shows a unique seed planted for future evidence
law in Georgia.

7. Id. at 280-81, 754 S.E.2d at 818.
8. Id. at 284, 754 S.E.2d at 821.
9. Id. at 287, 754 S.E.2d at 823.
10.

Id. at 286, 754 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting ESI Cos., Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 271 Ga. App.

181, 184-85, 609 S.E.2d 126, 129 (2004)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 286-87, 286 n.31, 754 S.E.2d at 822-23, 822 n.31.
13. See generally id. at 287 n.35, 754 S.E.2d at 823 n.35.
14. Id. at 287 n.36, 754 S.E.2d at 823 n.36.
15. Id. at 287, 754 S.E.2d at 823.
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HEARSAY: PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

In Grant v. State,16 the court of appeals confirmed Georgia's rule on
prior consistent statements, as developed through case law.'7 In that
case, Michael Grant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and
fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, which he received after
shooting his short-order cook while working as a restaurant manager.
Grant had multiple enumerations of error; the one most relevant here
is his argument that the trial court erred by allowing the state to
introduce certain prior consistent statements.'8
The statements at issue were by witnesses to the shooting who made
statements to the patrol officer at the scene that supported the
defendant, but whose later recorded testimony-and even later testimony
at trial-while consistent at those stages, were not consistent with their
original statements. 9 Grant argued in limine that the later interviews
with the witnesses should not be admitted since they "improperly
fortified or bolstered their testimony."" The court of appeals agreed
and held that the admission of these statements (played by recording to
the jury) was in error.2 '
The court explained its reasoning, stating, "[A] prior consistent
statement is only admissible if affirmative charges of recent fabrication,
improper influence, or improper motive are raised during crossexamination ...."" Otherwise, the statements are "pure hearsay
evidence." 2 The court also pointed out the crucial need for the prior
statement to predate alleged fabrication, which was not true of the
statements offered at trial in this instance.2

16. 326 Ga. App 121, 756 S.E.2d 255 (2014).
17. Id. at 128, 756 S.E.2d at 262.
18. Id. at 121-22, 756 S.E.2d at 257-58.
19. Id. at 127, 756 S.E.2d at 261-62.

20. Id.
21.
22.

Id. at 128, 756 S.E.2d at 262.
Id.

23. Id.
24.

Id. at 128-29, 756 S.E.2d at 262.
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26
25
The court referenced the new Evidence Code in its reasoning.
The court quoted Carlson on Evidence,27 stating, "Georgia had no
statute governing the admission of prior consistent statements in the
pre-2013 [evidence] code. OCGA § 24-6-613(c) fills this gap and codifies
The statute itself states, "If a prior consistent
[prior case law]."'
statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the
witness of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, the prior
consistent statement shall have been made before the alleged recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive arose." 9 Thus, the new
rule and the old rule are consistent regarding prior consistent statements; the new rule simply codifies what was previously decided over
time through the common law.

V.

SIMILAR TRANSACTIONS OR EVENTS

The Georgia Supreme Court has recently reviewed similar transaction
evidence in the context of a felony murder appeal. 0 In Reeves v.
State,"' the court confirmed Georgia's rule regarding similar transactions in criminal cases and recognized its codification in the new
Evidence Code."2 In Reeves, the defendant, Robert Lee Reeves, Jr., was
convicted of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault. The
defendant based his appeal partially on the fact that a prior offense had
been improperly admitted because the two transactions were not
sufficiently similar.3"
In reviewing the trial court's admission of the defendant's previous
guilty plea for attempt to commit rape, the supreme court noted that the
proper standard for the admission of similar transaction evidence
requires the following from the state: "(1) it must identify a proper

25.
26.

O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2013 & Supp. 2014).
Grant, 326 Ga. App. at 128 n.4, 756 S.E.2d at 262 n.4. Because Grant was tried

in 2011, the court noted that the "new Evidence Code [did] not apply to this case." Id. at
125 n.2, 756 S.E.2d at 260 n.2; see also Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (2011) ("This Act shall
become effective on January 1, 2013, and shall apply to any motion made or hearing or
trial commenced on or after such date.").
27.

RONALD L. CARLSON & MICHAEL SCOTT CARLSON, CARLSON ON EVIDENCE:

COMPARING THE GEORGIA RULES & FEDERAL RULES (2d ed. 2014).
28. Grant, 326 Ga. App. at 128 n.4, 756 S.E.2d at 262 n.4 (quoting CARLSON,supra note
27, at 269); see also O.C.G.A. § 24-6-613(c) (2013).
29.
30.

O.C.G.A. § 24-6-613(c) (emphasis added).
Reeves v. State, 294 Ga. 673, 673, 755 S.E.2d 695, 696-97 (2014).

31. 294 Ga. 673, 755 S.E.2d 695 (2014).
32. Id. at 675 n.3, 755 S.E.2d at 698 n.3.
33. Id. at 673, 755 S.E.2d at 696-97.
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purpose for admitting the transaction; (2) show that the accused
committed the independent offense; and (3) show a sufficient similarity
between the independent offense and the crime charged so that proof of
4
The proper purposes for
the former tends to prove the latter."
admitting this evidence at the time of the appellant's trial included to
show the defendant's "course of conduct, intent, modus operandi, scheme,
and bent of mind."' The court went on to detail the striking similarities between the two crimes in the case at issue: similar age, location,
and race of the victims, similar method of violence, similar time of year,
36
and similar time of day were all present.
Once again making a point to specifically note the similarities between
the new Evidence Code and its own ruling, the court stated that the
appellant's case was tried under Georgia's old Evidence Code, "under
which courts routinely admitted similar transaction evidence for
37
The new
purposes such as bent of mind or course of conduct."
Evidence Code includes "admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts for purposes including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident."' Thus, once again the similarities in the new
and old Evidence Codes are referenced by the appellate courts, but not
yet directly applied because of the timeline of the original trials that
39
The
were outside of the effective date for the new Evidence Code.
courts are clearly setting up the standards for interpretation of the new
Evidence Code for themselves and practitioners going forward.

VI.

THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE

During this survey period, the court of appeals recognized changes in
the best evidence rule. The new and old rules were contrasted in the
following cases, illustrating that duplicates and police sketches are more
clearly admissible under the new rules than the old.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 675, 755 S.E.2d at 698.
Id.
Id. at 676, 755 S.E.2d at 698-99.
Id. at 675 n.3, 755 S.E.2d at 698 n.3.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A § 24-4-404(b) (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 675 n.3, 755 S.E.2d at 698 n.3 (explaining that the "[defendant] was tried

in 2010 under Georgia's old Evidence Code [but] ...

Georgia's new Evidence Code ...

applies [only] to trials conducted after January 1, 2013"); see also Grant, 326 Ga. App. at
128 n.4, 756 S.E.2d at 262 n.4.
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Duplicatesas Admissible: New v. Old Evidence Code
In Leslie v. Doe,4° the court of appeals found reversible error when
the trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff after
failing to consider an affidavit that was submitted as a duplicate.41
There, the plaintiff stated in his complaint that he lost control of his
vehicle after another vehicle pulled out in front of him. The other
vehicle did not stop, the plaintiff flipped several times after losing
control, and an eyewitness provided an affidavit corroborating the
plaintiff's perception of the facts.42 The trial court found that "because
the affidavit was a photocopy and not an original, it was 'not sufficient
in a summary judgment context to constitute evidence."'4 The trial
court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff.44 The court of
appeals held that the trial court's failure to consider the affidavit as

A.

evidence because it was a duplicate constituted reversible error.45 It

was reversible error not only because the defendant failed to make an
objection based on the best evidence rule, but also because the court is
permitted to consider duplicate or "secondary" evidence if "it shall
appear that the primary evidence for some sufficient cause is not
accessible."46
In its reasoning, the court of appeals cited case law stating that copies
are able to be admitted "over objection" only if the original cannot be
properly accounted for.47 The rationale is that "although original
evidence is preferred over secondary evidence, secondary evidence is not
without value."48 Thus, if there is no objection made and a copy is
appropriately before the fact finder, summary judgment is improper.49
This case was not decided under the new Evidence Code, but once
again the court facilitated this transitional period by referencing what
rule would apply per the 2013 rules. 50 Under the new rules, where
O.C.G.A. § 24-5-351 has been replaced by O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1003,52 "[a]

40. 326 Ga. App. 154, 756 S.E.2d 238 (2014).
41. Id. at 154, 756 S.E.2d at 239.
42. Id. at 155, 756 S.E.2d at 240.
43. Id. at 156, 756 S.E.2d at 240-41 (quoting the trial court).
44. Id. at 156, 756 S.E.2d at 241.
45. Id. at 157-58, 756 S.E.2d at 242.
46. Id. at 156-57, 756 S.E.2d at 242.
47. Id. at 157,756 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting All Risk Ins. Agency v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
182 Ga. App. 190, 193-94, 355 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1987)).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 157-58, 756 S.E.2d at 242.
50. Id. at 157 n.6, 756 S.E.2d at 242 n.6.
51. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-3 (2010), repealed by Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (2011).
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duplicate shall be admissible to the same extent as an original unless:
(1) A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
(2) A circumstance exists where it would be unfair to admit the duplicate
in lieu of the original." '
Police Sketches: 'Writings" or Not?
The Georgia Supreme Court answered the above question under the
new rules and simultaneously pointed out that the question is moot due
to the clarity the new rules provide regarding police sketches." In
Boothe v. State,5 the court held that even if the trial court erred in
admitting photocopies of police sketches in violation of the best evidence
rule under the old rules, the error was harmless." A Clayton County
jury convicted Timothy Boothe of malice murder after his girlfriend was
found dead in her smoldering house, zip-tied to the bed with her mouth
bound in an ace bandage. The medical examiner found in the bandage
a blue latex glove that contained the defendant's DNA. The State also
admitted copies of two police sketches into evidence.57
These sketches are the basis of this case's inclusion in this Article. A
witness was riding her bike past the victim's house and saw a Caucasian
and an African-American man hanging around the house. They tried to
chase her and she got away. Later, she described the men to a sketch
artist at the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. At trial, the state never
accounted for why copies were to be used in place of the original.
Despite the objection by the defendant and no accounting for the
originals by the State, copies of the sketches were admitted into
evidence.5"
The supreme court, with Justice Nahmias penning the opinion, held
that the inclusion of the sketches may have been in error.59 He applied
the same statute discussed in the case above: O.C.G.A § 24-4-5(a). 0
That "archaic" (as Justice Nahmias described it) former statute required
that the original be accounted for before copies were allowed into
B.

52. O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1003 (2013).
53. Leslie, 326 Ga. App. at 157 n.6, 756 S.E.2d at 242 n.6 (quoting O.C.G.A.
1003).

§ 24-10-

54.

See Boothe v. State, 293 Ga. 285, 288 n.6, 745 S.E.2d 594, 597 n.6 (2013).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

293 Ga. 285, 745 S.E.2d 594 (2013).
Id. at 286, 745 S.E.2d at 595.
Id. at 286, 745 S.E.2d at 596.
Id.
Id. at 289, 745 S.E.2d at 597-98.

60.

Id. at 288-89, 745 S.E.2d at 597-98; see also O.C.G.A § 24-4-5(a) (2010), repealedby

Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (2011).
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evidence if a best evidence objection was made.61 Despite this potential
error, the court held that other significant evidence was available to
support the finding of guilt, making the sketches irrelevant to the jury's
finding. 2
The court then discussed whether police sketches should be considered
"writings" under the former best evidence rule in Georgia, an issue of
first impression for Georgia's appellate courts.6" The court examined
the definition of writings to find whether sketches belonged, noting that
though documents with words on them are almost always writings under
Georgia law, photographs are not considered writings.6" The court even
pointed out a California case, noting that "a sketch, like a handwritten
document, is produced by a writing implement and is based on the
artist's subjective interpretation of information supplied to the artist as
65
she draws on the page," making the decision a "close question."
Ultimately, the court determined the discussion was largely irrelevant
based on the court's holding that other evidence, "not ... the sketches
... [but instead, the] evidence.., that he left at the crime scene," was
the "main witness" against the defendant.66
Justice Melton authored a strong dissent with Justice Benham
joining.67 The justices disagreed with the majority by arguing that the
sketches were admitted in error and that error was not harmless. 8
Justice Melton noted, "In order to conclude that the former best evidence
rule has no application to the police sketch copies here, we would have
to accept the unreasonable proposition that police sketches are more
akin to 'photographs' than to 'writings.'"69 This position is unreasonable, according to the dissent, because there is a clear difference between
the two: a writing is captured by hand with a person's perspective while
a photograph is "captured by a mechanical device."7 ' The dissent also
strongly questioned and disagreed with the majority's perspective that
the jury did not rely on these sketches, especially because the other

61. Boothe, 293 Ga. at 288, 745 S.E.2d at 597.
62. Id. at 289-90, 745 S.E.2d at 598.
63. Id. at 288, 745 S.E.2d at 597.
64. Id.; see, e.g., Norris v. State, 289 Ga. 154, 158, 709 S.E.2d 792, 796 (2011)
(concluding letters are writings); Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 5, 8, 222 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1976)
(concluding photographs are not writings).
65. Boothe, 293 Ga. at 289, 745 S.E.2d at 597 (citing People v. Garcia, 201 Cal. App.
324, 328 n.1 (1988)).
66. Id. at 293-94, 745 S.E.2d at 600-01.
67. Id. at 295-99, 745 S.E.2d at 602-05 (Melton, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 295-96, 745 S.E.2d at 602.
69. Id. at 296, 745 S.E.2d at 602.
70. Id. at 296-97, 745 S.E.2d at 602-03.
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evidence was "entirely circumstantial" and could generally be explained
through other means."
Importantly, the footnotes from both the majority opinion and the
dissent explicitly reference how this case may have been affected by the
new Evidence Code's more overt language.72 The new Evidence Code
defines "writing" as "letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set
down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, magnetic
impulse, or mechanical or electronic recording or other form of data
compilation."73 Thus, the new Evidence Code more clearly articulates
the gaps found in the old Evidence Code with regard to writings and
recordings under the best evidence rule.

VII.

SIMILAR TRANSACTION EVIDENCE

The admissibility of similar transaction evidence has changed slightly
under the new rules. In Latimore v. State,74 the court of appeals
followed previous precedent regarding similar transaction evidence.75
There, a jury convicted Maynard Latimore of theft by shoplifting for
stealing merchandise from a Home Depot. The evidence showed that a
woman repeatedly entered Home Depot stores, purchased items, and
then obtained a receipt. Latimore would then enter the same Home
Depot stores and leave with the exact items the woman had purchased,
but without paying for them. This kind of theft, as it was explained to
the jury, is called a "double shop."76
Latimore's previous shoplifting convictions were entered into evidence.
Each and every previous act involved stealing items from a Home Depot,
and most of those convictions involved a "double shop" or attempt to
walk out of the store past the cashiers with a receipt in hand despite his
failure to purchase the items. Latimore argued that the previous
convictions were too different to be admissible because the items stolen
were different.7 7 However, for previous transaction evidence to be

71. Id. at 297-99, 745 S.E.2d at 603-05.
72. See id. at 288 n.6, 745 S.E.2d at 597 n.6 (majority opinion); id. at 295 n.15, 745
S.E.2d at 602 n.15 (Melton, J., dissenting).
73. O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1001(1) (2013). The rule applies to writings, recordings, and
photographs. O.C.G-.A § 24-10-1002 (2013).
74. 323 Ga. App. 848, 748 S.E.2d 487 (2013).

75. Id. at 850, 748 S.E.2d at 490.
76. Id. at 848, 748 S.E.2d at 488-89.
77. Id. at 849-50, 748 S.E.2d at 489-90.
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admissible, "the proper focus is on the similarities, not the differences,
between the separate crime and the crime in question.""8
Though the former Evidence Code applied to this decision, the court
of appeals continued to facilitate the transition to the new Evidence
Code by noting the differences in a footnote.79 In footnote 1, the court
stated, "We note that for trials conducted after January 1, 2013, the new
Evidence Code permits the admission of similar-transaction evidence for
the purpose of proving 'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident .

. . ."'

The

difference is that these transactions are no longer admissible
for the
81
purpose of proving "course of conduct" or "bent of mind."
In a similar case involving a drug trafficking conviction, the court of
appeals continued to explain the differences between the new and old
Evidence Codes (and once again in the footnotes).82 There, the defendants appealed their convictions for drug trafficking with several
enumerations of error, including one based on admission of similar
transaction evidence. The appellants argued that the State should not
have been permitted to introduce evidence of a previous North Carolina
search of their vehicle that produced nearly $200,000 in shrink-wrapped
cash because it was not sufficiently similar to the present crime." The
court of appeals examined the similarities between the incidents,
pursuant to the standard under the former relevant provision, and held
them to be as follows: (1) the cars were registered in Massachusetts, (2)
the windows were tinted a dark color, (3) the driver used a single key,
(4) the car contained religious insignia throughout, and (5) the car
contained compartments with shrink-wrapped items (drugs in one case
while the car was traveling north, and cash in the other while the car
was traveling south).'
The court held that based on the above facts, "proof of the former
tends to prove the latter," and thus there was no error in admitting the

78. Id. at 850, 748 S.E.2d at 490 (quoting Muhammad v. State, 290 Ga. 880, 882-83,
725 S.E.2d 302, 304 (2012)).
79. Id. at 850 n.1, 748 S.E.2d at 490 n.1.
80. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b)). This language mirrors the federal rules. See
FED. R. EviD. 404.
81. Latimore, 323 Ga. App. at 850 n.1, 748 S.E.2d at 490 n.1 (quoting Betancourt v.
State, 322 Ga. App. 201, 206 n.15, 744 S.E.2d 419, 425 n.15 (2013)).
82. Betancourt, 322 Ga. App. at 206 n.15, 744 S.E.2d at 425 n.15, affd on othergrounds
sub nom. Hernandez v. State, 294 Ga. 903, 757 S.E.2d 109 (2014) (explaining differences
between the new and old evidence code).
83. Betancourt, 322 Ga. App. at 201, 206-07, 744 S.E.2d at 421, 424-25.
84. Id. at 207, 744 S.E.2d at 425.
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similar transaction evidence.' The court noted the same provisions
under the new Evidence Code as noted above regarding admission of
evidence for the purpose of proving "motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident," 8 but not for the purpose of proving "course of conduct" or
"bent of mind." 7 The court also cited a secondary source explaining
that the "primary change" in the rules is the "non-incorporation" of these
last two specific categories and the inclusion of "federal rule topics like
preparation, plan and additional related grounds as reasons for
admitting 'other crimes' evidence." 8
IX.

CONCLUSION

This survey period produced novel and interesting decisions that
continue to shape the state of evidence law in Georgia. The appellate
courts are continuing to facilitate the transition to the new Evidence
Code as they specifically define provisions that have changed under the
new Code even when they do not yet specifically apply to the case at
hand. The next survey period will likely produce an even larger number
of novel interpretations of the new Code as cases are appealed that were
originally tried within the effective date for the new Evidence Code.

85. Id. (quoting Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642, 409 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1991)).

86. Id. at 206 n.15, 744 S.E.2d at 425 n.15 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b)).

87. Id. (quoting Harvey v. State, 292 Ga. 792, 794, 741 S.E.2d 625, 627 (2013)).
88. Id. (quoting CARLSON, supra note 27, at 55).

